Automated review from the Sprayberry Labs fleet code reviewer (sprayberry-reviewer bot — independent, gating).

Verdict: no blocking issues found — approving.

What I checked

1. SHA pin consistency — package.json ↔ package-lock.json (root dep ↔ node_modules resolved)

All three bumps are coherent across both files:

The overrides field in package.json pins the redstamp transitive dep used by strongroom and truecopy — unchanged, correct.

2. New test logic — test/audit.test.mjs (lines 70–97)

Traced the full execution path:

• runTrilogy() always produces exactly 10 in-memory audit entries across its 4 beats (4+1+2+3). audit.flush(trailPath) writes them all to disk. audit.entries.at(-1) is safe — 10 entries guaranteed.
• Checkpoint is captured from in-memory state before disk tampering — correctly models an in-process gate holding state an on-disk attacker can't reach.
• lines.length >= 3 precondition: with 10 entries on disk, dropping 2 leaves 8 — the bare chain remains internally valid (each link's prev still matches its predecessor), so verifyAuditFile(trailPath).ok === true holds. The >= 3 floor is conservative but sound.
• The checkpoint assertion caught.reason === 'truncated' is the correct discriminant for the new redstamp 0.5.1 { head, count } verification path.

3. Demo logic — demo/audit-demo.mjs (lines 71–104)

const fresh = runTrilogy() correctly starts a new vault in a fresh tmpdir (each runTrilogy() call sets KEEPER_HOME to its own isolated dir). The demo's self-check at lines 93–96:

if (!barePrefix.ok || vsCheckpoint.ok || vsCheckpoint.reason !== 'truncated') {
  console.error('demo failed: tail-truncation was not caught against the checkpoint');
  process.exit(1);
}

…correctly fails the demo if (a) the bare chain didn't pass the prefix (unexpected), (b) the checkpoint didn't catch it (unexpected), or (c) the reason string changed. Logic is right.

4. CI

All four checks pass: test (17/17), verify pinned tool surface, CodeQL, analyze (javascript-typescript).

5. README

Documentation accurately describes the tail-truncation scenario, the verifyAuditFile(path, checkpoint) API, and the in-memory checkpoint model. No misleading claims.

What's good

The fourth-guarantee story is now complete: edit → caught, mid-log deletion → caught, tail-truncation → caught (with checkpoint). The design correctly puts the checkpoint in the in-process gate (not on disk), so the only tamper surface the attacker controls — the JSONL file — can't defeat it. The test exercises all three branches cleanly and the demo self-checks its own invariants.